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The idea that future practise can somehow influence current behaviour has been examined within 
the paradigm of precognition. Previous work attempting to examine possible precognitive effects 
using a modified repetition priming task showed that participants were more accurate to respond 
to material they would see again in the future. Such a finding was taken to indicate that a task 
relying primarily on accuracy of performance, such as a memory recall task, could be a more 
sensitive measure of precognition, or ‘precall’. Furthermore, utilising arousing images as opposed 
to everyday words may elicit a stronger precall effect, and by conducting such a study on-line it 
may be possible to eliminate and/or reduce any potential experimenter effects. The prediction 
when completing such a task was that post-recall practise would lead to greater precall of those 
items practised compared to items not practised. Such an on-line precall study utilising emotive 
images was completed by 94 participants. However, comparison of the accuracy between images 
that were subsequently repeated and those that were not showed no evidence of a precall effect. 
Nevertheless, post recall practise did show an initial improvement in accuracy which plateaued 
after the second trial. The failure to find any evidence of precall could simply be indicative of the 
impossibility of such a notion. However, given that others have reported precall effects the failure 
to find a precall effect in this study is discussed in terms of possible methodological factors 













Precognition refers to the ability to perceive and/or behave in a way that is influenced by a future 
event that would not be anticipated through any known inferential process (see, Mossbridge, 
Tressoldi, Utts, Ives, & Radin, 2014; Taylor, 2014). Such behaviour may be conscious or 
unconscious, cognitive or affective, and has been examined utilising a variety of methods. Over 
time, this has included Zener cards, dice, light configurations, as well as possible changes in 
physiology (see, Cardena, Marcusson-Clavertz, & Palmer, 2015; Irwin & Watt, 2007). More 
recently, Bem (2011) utilised a range of standard psychology paradigms that incorporated a time 
reversed element to test for potential precognitive effects. These included a mere exposure 
paradigm, repetition priming, habituation and recall paradigms. In all cases the idea was that an 
individual’s performance would be influenced by exposure to and/or processing of a stimulus after 
an original response has been made and recorded. For instance, the time reversed recall task would 
examine the positive effect on memory recall performance for items that are practiced after the 
recall responses have been made. Given the commonplace finding that practice or rehearsal of 
items improves subsequent recall performance (see, Bahrick, 2000) the question posed here is 
whether practice after the recall performance would have a reversed time influence such that recall 
performance is improved for those items practiced compared to those that are not. Such an effect 
is generally referred to as a precall effect. Thus, precall represents the positive effect on memory 
recall performance for items that are practised after the recall test.  
Bem (2011) reported on nine such experiments testing precognition across a range of paradigms 
and found that eight out of the nine studies showed evidence of a significant precognitive effect. 
Interestingly, the non-significant study did show a trend in the predicted direction. Furthermore, 
the studies utilising the precall type paradigm showed the most robust effect sizes (mean ES 0.31) 
compared to the habituation (mean ES 0.15), or priming (mean ES 0.25) studies. However, 
attempts by a number of independent research teams have yielded conflicting results (see e.g., 
Galak, LeBouf, Nelson, & Simmons, 2012; Ritchie, Wiseman, & French, 2012). Though 
modifications in the precise methodology may to some extent account for such differences (see, 
Bem, Tressoldi, Rabeyron, & Duggan, 2015). Given the variability in findings some have 
suggested utilising meta-analyses as a possible way of attempting to resolve such debates and 
identify possible generality effects across samples, stimuli and protocols. For instance, early work 
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by Honorton and Ferrari (1989) examining possible precognitive effects from 1935 to 1987 
reported a small but significant effect of precognition. More recently, Storm, Tressoldi, and Di 
Risio (2012) examined studies from 1987 to 2010 and though they found a slightly lower effect 
size their results were still significantly above chance expectations. Finally, Bem et al. (2015) 
undertook a more comprehensive review of research conducted from 2000 to 2013, which included 
unpublished reports, as well as conference proceedings and once again found clear and decisive 
evidence in support of precognitive effects. Nevertheless, some still argue that the findings 
overstate the evidence and that when such data is re-analysed the evidence is ‘not sufficient to 
sway an appropriately skeptical reader’ (Rouder & Morey, 2011, p.688). Unsurprisingly this has 
resulted in some suggesting that the use of meta-analyses rarely succeeds in resolving ideological 
debates (Ferguson, 2014). This in turn has meant that such contentious and often ambiguous 
findings have led to calls for more research to be conducted in an effort to bring both sides of the 
argument together (Franklin, Baumgart, & Schooler, 2014). 
With this in mind an initial study was conducted utilising a modified repetition priming paradigm 
to examine possible precognitive priming effects (Vernon, 2015). This modified priming task 
showed no evidence of precognition when looking at the response times, but did find that 
participants were more accurate to respond to words they would see again in the future (Vernon, 
2015). It was noted that such an anomalous finding could represent either a Type I error, or suggest 
that the component of memory that relies on accuracy, as opposed to speed, may be more 
susceptible to precognitive influences. While such a possibility is speculative, given the unknown 
nature of precognition, there is some support that tasks relying only on speed of response show 
less evidence of precognitive effects (e.g., Traxler, Foss, Podali, & Zirnstein, 2012), compared to 
those relying on accuracy of performance (see, Bem, 2011; Subbotsky, 2013). This would suggest 
that a memory task relying primarily on accuracy of performance, such as a memory recall task, 
could be a more sensitive measure of precognition. Hence, one aim of the current study was to 
utilise a memory recall task that was based on the accuracy of recall as opposed to the speed.  
Alongside changes to the nature of the task from one that focuses on speed to one that relies more 
on accuracy it may also be that changing the stimuli and the nature of the post recall practise 
sessions could also influence potential precall effects. For instance, the repetition priming 
paradigm reported by Vernon (2015) used everyday words relating to living and non-living 
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objects. However, others have suggested that possible precognitive effects may be proportional to 
the level of physiological arousal elicited by the stimuli used (see, Lobach, 2009; Maier et al., 
2014). The point here is that stimuli that elicit stronger feelings of pleasure and/or discomfort may 
be better suited to producing precognitive effects. Hence, using positive and negative arousing 
images, compared to everyday words, may lead to a more robust precall effect. In addition, 
previous research has utilised a variety of post-recall practise tasks that include categorisation of 
the presented words and visualisation of the related image (Bem, 2011; Galak et al., 2012; Ritchie 
et al., 2012). The rationale for selecting these specific practise tasks is unclear and may simply 
relate to the fact that they were used in the initial studies by Bem (2011). However, there are two 
points that need to be considered here. First, researchers fail to report performance on these post-
test practise tasks. That is, how well participants were able to classify and/or image the referents. 
Second, that such practise tasks can be completed without the need to ‘remember’ the stimuli. That 
is, neither the categorisation nor visualisation tasks require the participant to ‘recall’ the 
words/images and as such there is no requirement to strengthen the memory representation for 
those items. It has long been known that rehearsal and practise enhances standard memory recall 
of items (see e.g., Bjork, 1988). However, it is not known yet if the retroactive memory effects 
evidenced by precall are subject to the same influences and potential limitations as standard 
memory effects but if so it would make sense to ensure that the memory representation for the 
practised items was strengthened as much as possible. Hence, having a practise task that requires 
participants to recall the items multiple times would lead to a stronger memory representation, 
which in turn could lead to more robust precall effects. Furthermore, consistent with the transfer 
appropriate processing view of memory, and Taylor’s (2014) block view of the universe, it may 
be that similarity in processing between the recall test and the post recall practise task facilitates 
precognitive performance (see, Brown & Craik, 2000).  
Thus, this study tested potential precall effects by using both positive and negative arousing images 
whilst incorporating a post-test recall practise task. In addition, the task was run on-line to reduce 
any possible bias and/or experimenter effects (see, Schlitz, Wiseman, Watt, & Radin, 2006). The 
prediction was that in the test phase participants will recall more of the items that appear in the 





Pre-Registration with KPU 
This study was pre-registered at the Koestler Parapsychology Unit (ref#1019) and a copy of the 
raw data uploaded to the site.   
 
Participants  
The study was halted once 121 participants had begun the study with 94 completing it (completion 
rate of 77.68%). This was based on a-priori power analysis showing that an N of 90 would be 
required (see KPU ref#1019). These 94 participants were opportunity sampled via an advertised 
web-link to the on-line study and completed the study voluntarily. Of the 94 participants, 26 were 
male and 68 female, with ages ranging from 22 to 62 (mean 42.9, SD 11.61). 
 
Materials  
The experiment utilised Qualtrics software (www.qualtrics.com) to build and present the study on 
line. This incorporated a Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS: Tobacyk, 2004) to assess 
participants’ belief in anomalous events and a selection 28 images from the International Affective 
Picture Systems (IAPS) database (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). These 28 images consisted 
of 14 positively valenced items and 14 negatively valenced items (see Appendix A). The images 
differed significantly in terms of valence (Positive: 7.19; Negative: 3.52; t(26)14.47, p=0.001, 95% 
CI (3.14, 4.18), d=5.5) but were matched for mean arousal level (Positive: 5.86; Negative: 5.78; 
t(26)0.343, p=0.734, 95% CI (-0.395, 0.553), d=0.13.). The 28 images were then used to construct 
8 sub-lists each containing 14 images (7 positive and 7 negative) with each sub-list matched for 





The six stages of the experiment are illustrated in Figure 1. The first stage provided a brief written 
outline of the study, stating that it aimed to examine extra sensory perception (ESP) and that this 
would involve viewing images that contained both positive and negatively valenced items which 
may elicit an emotional response and that if exposure to such images would be thought to have 
any negative impact then there was a recommendation not to continue. This was followed by a 
multiple choice question obtaining informed consent, a captcha question to exclude possible bots 
participating and then a question regarding demographics and finally the revised paranormal belief 
scale. The second stage followed on immediately and presented the 28 images, cropped to a width 
of 700px and a height of 525px, with each image appearing in the centre of the screen along with 
a written identifier (i.e., name) written in Arial font size 36pt. Each image, along with its name, 
was presented on screen for 3 seconds. The third stage presented an open text box along with 
instructions to recall and enter the name of as many of the previously seen 28 images as possible 
in any order within 3 minutes. A clock also appeared in the top left of the screen counting down 
the time. Stage four presented participants with a sub-set of 14 images in the same format and for 
the same time duration as the initial images. These sub-sets of images were completely 
counterbalanced to ensure that each image occurred equally often in the repeated and non-repeated 
conditions. Stage five presented an open text box along with instructions to type in the name of 
the images just seen in any order within 2 minutes. Again, a clock appeared in the top left of the 
screen counting down the time. Stages 4 and 5 were then repeated three more times. This meant 
that across the main recall and post-recall practise stages each participant saw 84 images. Stage 6 
required participants to answer whether they had left their PC or switched to another 
window/application during the study and then provided debrief information along with the 
experimenters contact details. 
 
________________ 






The study was conducted on-line using Qualtrics software to deliver all information and stimuli 
and record all participant input via their keyboard. The study began by presenting an information 
screen informing participants they are about to participate in a study exploring ESP, although the 
precise nature of this was not made clear until the final debrief at the end of the study. Once 
informed consent was obtained participants progressed to an information capture screen and 
entered demographic details and completed the revised paranormal belief scale (Tobacyk, 2004). 
The precise instructions given to participants then stated they would ‘be presented with a selection 
of both positive and negative images. Each image will remain on screen for 3 seconds. Please 
attend to the images and do not write anything down’. Following this the software presented all 28 
images, with the appropriate image name appearing above the image, in a random sequence with 
each image/name appearing on screen for 3 seconds. The software used an inbuilt Mersenne 
Twister pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) to randomly select the order of stimuli 
presentation. Once all images had been shown participants then completed a surprise recall test. 
Precise instructions were ‘your task is now to recall as many of the images you have just seen and 
write their names in the box below. You have 3 minutes to do this. You can write them in any 
order and spelling isn’t important’. A timer on screen counted down from 3 minutes to provide an 
indication of how much time remained. Following this the software pseudo-randomly presented 
participants with one of four sub-lists of 14 images (see Appendix B), with the proviso that the 
PRNG evenly select the four sub-lists. This sub-list of 14 images (7 positive and 7 negative) was 
then presented in exactly the same way as the original list of 28 images. Once this had been 
completed another recall screen appeared with an open text box and a 2-minute timer. Participants 
then had 2 minutes to recall, in any order, as many of the just seen 14 images as they could in the 
allotted time. This presentation of the same sub-list of 14 images followed by a recall stage was 
repeated a further three times. Following this a check screen asked participants if at any time during 
the study they shifted screens to check emails, looked away from their PC, wrote down the words 
etc. to help their recall. Finally, participants were provided with an information/debrief screen 






Full University Faculty ethics approval was obtained for this study (Ref: 15/SAS/213C). 
 
Results  
The RPBS was coded according to Tobacyk (2004) to create the 7 sub-scales of; traditional 
religious belief; Psi; Witchcraft; Superstition; Spiritualism; Extraordinary Life Forms, and 
Precognition. Precall was measured using level of recall accuracy for images recalled in stage 3 
that were later repeated in stage 4 compared to those that were not-repeated. Given the requirement 
for participants to type in the name of the image it is possible that a name could be miss-spelt or 
that a name may only be partially typed due to the time restriction. To deal with this all incorrectly 
spelled items were viewed by two external judges, blind to the aims of the study, to ascertain 
whether they sufficiently identified the appropriate image. For partially typed responses a key 
criterion used was the requirement that there be a greater than 50% level of mapping between the 
letters and placements of the partially typed input and the name of the image.  
 
RPBS Data  
Data on the seven sub-scales of the RPBS are presented in Table 1.  
 
________________ 
Table 1 about here 
________________ 
 
Precall Data  
Ninety-four participants were each exposed to 28 images, creating a total of 2632 trials. Of these 
there were 51 (1.9%) that required additional consideration by two coders blind to the aims of the 
study due to spelling and/or grammar issues. The two coders who examined these items agreed 
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100% on the outcome. This included 7 instances of accepting ‘motorbike’ for ‘motorcycle’, 8 
instances of accepting ‘cockroaches’ for ‘cockroach’, 18 instances of accepting ‘lightening’ for 
‘lightning’, 1 instance of accepting ‘lighting’ for ‘lightning, 1 instance of accepting ‘jaguer’ for 
‘jaguar’, 10 instances of accepting ‘windsurfer’ for ‘windsurfers’ and 6 instances of accepting 
‘skydiver’ for ‘skydivers’. There were also 14 (0.5%) intrusions which did not refer to any of the 
images seen but were invariably semantically related (e.g., cheetah and leopard in place of jaguar) 
and were excluded from the analysis.    
 
A repeated measures t test was conducted on recall scores comparing level of recall of images that 
were repeated with those that were not-repeated. A 2-tailed test was used to allow for the 
possibility that post-recall repetition of the images could impair precall performance (see, Ritchie 
et al., 2012). This showed that the level of mean recall for repeated images did not differ from 
images not-repeated (respective means: 7.28 vs. 7.38), t(93)=0.374, p=0.710, 95% CI (-0.604, 
0.413), d=0.05. The effect sizes of the precall scores for positive images was d = -0.11, for negative 
images was d = 0.05. The precall score for positive and negatively valenced images along with 
their respective baseline can be seen in Table 2.  
 
________________ 
Table 2 about here 
________________ 
 
Of the 94 participants that took part 35 (37.2%) reported in the post study questionnaire that they 
were either distracted or switched to another application (e.g., to check emails, facebook) during 
the study. When the main analysis was re-run, restricting the sample to those that did not report 
any such distractions or switching there was still no difference in the level of mean recall for 
repeated images compared to images not-repeated (respective means: 7.0 vs. 7.18), t(58)=0.574, 




To examine possible links between participant belief in paranormal events correlations were 
conducted between participant’s precall scores and their scores on the RPBS, see Table 3. None 
of these correlations were significant (all ps>0.3). 
 
________________ 





Post Recall Practise  
The pattern of post recall performance was examined using a repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with single factor of Time containing 4 levels (time1, time2, time3 and time4). 
The assumption of sphericity was not met, Mauchly’s W(5)=0.816, p,0.01, hence the Greenhouse-
Geiser correction was used when interpreting the ANOVA. This showed a main effect of Time 
F(2.67,248.9)=16.201, p<0.001, Mse=2.36, η2=0.148. Pairwise comparisons using a Bonferroni 
correction to control for inflated Type I errors showed a significant increase in mean recall from 
time1 to time2 (respective means: 10.56 and 11.54) p<0.001, 95% CI(-1.473, -0.484), d=0.5. There 
was no further change in mean recall from time2 to time4 (all ps>0.5), see Table 4.    
 
________________ 







The results show no evidence for any precall effect when using both positive and negative arousing 
images. Nevertheless, the post recall practise phases do show an initial increase in recall accuracy 
but this plateaus after the second practise session suggesting that two post recall practise phases 
may be sufficient to establish a robust memory with continued practise having little or no effect. 
There are in essence two alternative views that can be taken when attempting to interpret the 
pattern of data here. On the one hand, the data show no precall effects simply because there were 
none as such effects represent a scientific impossibility. This view would fit more consistently 
with others who report null effects when examining the possibility of precognition (see e.g., Galak 
et al., 2012; Ritchie et al., 2012) and possibly bolster the arguments that any such reported effects 
may at best be more simply accounted for in terms of improper statistical analysis (e.g., 
Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011), or at worst, represent potential fraud 
(see e.g., Stokes, 2015). Of course, the argument that precognition is impossible, or any cognitive 
process for that matter, may say more about our current understanding of science, or the lack of it, 
than it does about the nature of such unusual phenomena. On the other hand, it may be that 
precognition represents a real effect and this study simply failed to find it. This approach would 
be more consistent with those reporting significant precognitive effects (Bem, 2011; Maier et al., 
2014; Subbotsky, 2013) as well as the positive overviews obtained from the various meta-analyses 
(Bem et al., 2015; Honorton & Ferrari, 1989; Steinkamp, Milton, & Morris, 1998). At this moment 
in time however it is not possible to clearly identify which of these interpretive possibilities is 
correct. Hence, in an attempt to remain critical, yet open minded, which should be the hallmark of 
any scientist, the author offers the following discussion points as possible reasons why no potential 
precall effect was found in the current study. This includes the level of participant’s belief in such 
phenomena, whether they are relaxed and/or distracted during the task, the potential arousing 
nature of the stimuli themselves, and the slow/explicit nature of the task. 
It is possible that individual belief may have influenced participant’s behaviour in this study. For 
example, research has shown that belief can be an important predictor of success in psi experiments 
(see e.g., Palmer, 1971). Where individuals can be classified into the unflattering categories of 
either sheep (i.e., believers) or goats (i.e., non-believers) with research showing that those with a 
higher belief in the paranormal tend to score above chance whereas those with a lower level of 
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belief score either at chance or below it (see e.g., Parker, 2000). Given that the initial information 
page explicitly informed participants they would be taking part in a study looking at possible ESP 
effects it is likely that their belief could have influenced the outcome. Furthermore, the mean 
overall score on the RPBS for the current group was 77.6 which is slightly lower than the reported 
norm of 89.1 by Tobacyk (2004). Hence, it is possible that the opportunity sample utilised in this 
study may have contained individuals with a more sceptical frame of mind, which in turn may 
have reduced any possible precall effects. Furthermore, recruiting potentially sceptical participants 
may have led to a reduction in variability, which could account for the lack of any correlation 
between scores on the belief scale and precall scores. Future research could address this by either 
attempting to recruit participants from specific target groups thought to have higher levels of belief 
in psi phenomena, and/or pre-screen all participants to ensure a target level of belief is expressed 
prior to having them take part in the experiment.  
Alongside belief in psi phenomena it is possible that participants in the current study were not 
sufficiently relaxed during the memory task for any possible precall effects to emerge. For 
instance, Bem (2011) in his original suite of experiments began by presenting participants with an 
image whilst simultaneously playing new-age type music in an effort to help them relax. Such a 
view would be consistent with the early findings of Braud (1974) suggesting that relaxed 
participants perform better in psi related tasks (see also, Honorton, 1977). However, no 
images/music or relaxation induction stage were included in the current study. As such, future 
research could address this by including a specific ‘relaxation induction’ phase in an effort to help 
the participants relax and potentially facilitate any possible precall effects. 
Given that the current study was also run on-line it is also possible that participants may have 
experienced other ‘distractions’ during the task that took them away from the focus of the study. 
For instance, of the 94 participants that took part 35 (37.2%) of them reported in the post recall 
question phase that they had either switched applications and/or been distracted by something in 
their environment during the completion of the task. Such a possibility would be consistent with 
the suggestions of Braud (2002) who suggested that psi ‘type’ effects are invariably weak signals 
that can be overwhelmed and/or obscured by noise or distractions. Of course, it is not always 
possible to control all aspects of the environment, particularly when using an on-line delivery 
method as in the current study. Nevertheless, greater emphasis could be made at the beginning of 
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such a study emphasising to the participants the need to complete the task in a quiet place away 
from any external distractions.  
The current study used images from the IAPS database that were classified as either positive or 
negatively arousing however, it is possible that the level of valence and/or arousal of these images 
may not have been sufficiently emotive. For instance, Maier et al. (2014) in their study on 
precognition used images from the IAPS with a positive valence of 7.57 and negative valence of 
1.73 compared to the images used in the current study which had a positive valence of 7.19 and a 
negative valence of 3.52. Interestingly Maier et al (2014) found a precognitive effect for the 
negative images but not for the positive images. Given this, it may be that using more emotive 
images would elicit a precall effect. Such a possibility would be consistent with suggestions that 
the more emotive the stimulus the more likely a psi effect will emerge (see e.g., Lobach, 2009; 
Radin, 2004).  
Finally, the precall task used here involved presenting stimuli over time and allowing up to 3 
minutes for participants to recall them. Such time would allow participants to adopt a more 
deliberate, conscious and attentive strategy for responding, all of which would naturally reflect 
explicit ‘slow’ processes. It may be that a task that is more reliant on slow explicit processes 
overshadows and/or reduces the possible influence of any psi-based behaviour. Whereas a task 
that is more reliant on faster implicit processes may be more amenable to eliciting such anomalous 
effects. This idea is consistent with the view put forward by Bargh and Ferguson (2000) that psi 
behaviour may be better understood and explored using more indirect and/or implicit measures. 
To some extent it also supported by the recent meta-analysis from Bem et al. (2015) which showed 
more robust precognitive effects for the fast-thinking type tasks, with no clear evidence of 
precognition when the slower thinking protocols were used. However, this picture is neither 
consistent nor clear. For instance, in the studies reported by Bem (2011) it is the slower explicit 
recall task that shows the greatest precognitive effect. In contrast, a repetition priming task 
requiring fast responses reported by Vernon (2015) failed to show any evidence of precognition. 
Furthermore, it may also be worth noting that researchers could be confounding the distinction 
between explicit/implicit processes with slow/fast thinking tasks. Hence, this distinction between 
explicit/slow and implicit/fast may be useful but needs to be more clearly examined to allow the 
contribution of each aspect to be teased apart. As such, it may represent a potentially fruitful 
avenue for future researchers.  
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In conclusion, no evidence of precall was found for an on-line task using emotive images. 
However, a number of methodological points are offered for consideration, including the level of 
belief in psi phenomena of the participants, the use of a relaxation induction, possible distractions 
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Positive Image IAP# Valence  Arousal  
 
Negative Image IAP# Valence  Arousal  
Jaguar 1650 6.65 6.23 
 
Snake  1110 3.84 5.96 
Waterfall 5260 7.34 5.71 
 
Spider  1201 3.55 6.36 
Skydivers 5621 7.57 6.99 
 
Dog 1302 4.21 6.00 
Mountains  5700 7.61 5.68 
 
Shark 1930 3.79 6.42 
Windsurfers  5623 7.19 5.67 
 
Bomb 2692 3.36 5.35 
Baby 2660 7.75 4.44 
 
Cockroach 1274 3.17 5.39 
Fireworks  5910 7.8 5.59 
 
Gun 6610 3.6 5.06 
Lightning  5950 5.99 6.79 
 
Tornado  5971 3.49 6.65 
Cakes 7220 6.91 5.3 
 
Tank 6940 3.53 5.35 
Pizza  7350 7.1 4.97 
 
Boxer 8060 5.36 5.31 
Gymnast 8470 7.74 6.14 
 
Toilet  9301 2.26 5.28 
Motorcycle  8251 6.16 6.05 
 
Solider 9160 3.23 5.87 
Pilot  8300 7.02 6.14 
 
Skull  9480 3.51 5.57 
Money  8501 7.91 6.44 
 
Ship  9600 2.48 6.46 
         
 
Mean  7.20 5.87 
  





The 8 sub-lists (consisting of 4 practise lists and 4 no-practise baseline lists) created from the 
original list of 28 images with valence and arousal ratings.  
 
Practice 1 IAP# Valence  Arousal  
 
No practice 
baseline IAP# Valence  Arousal  
Snake  1110 3.84 5.96 
 
Jaguar 1650 6.65 6.23 
Spider  1201 3.55 6.36 
 
Waterfall 5260 7.34 5.71 
Dog 1302 4.21 6 
 
Skydivers 5621 7.57 6.99 
Shark 1930 3.79 6.42 
 
Mountains  5700 7.61 5.68 
Bomb 2692 3.36 5.35 
 
Windsurfers  5623 7.19 5.67 
Cockroach 1274 3.17 5.39 
 
Baby 2660 7.75 4.44 
Gun 6610 3.6 5.06 
 
Fireworks  5910 7.8 5.59 
Lightning  5950 5.99 6.79 
 
Tornado  5971 3.49 6.65 
Cakes 7220 6.91 5.3 
 
Tank 6940 3.53 5.35 
Pizza  7350 7.1 4.97 
 
Boxer 8060 5.36 5.31 
Gymnast 8470 7.74 6.14 
 
Toilet  9301 2.26 5.28 
Motorcycle  8251 6.16 6.05 
 
Solider 9160 3.23 5.87 
Pilot  8300 7.02 6.14 
 
Skull  9480 3.51 5.57 
Money  8501 7.91 6.44 
 
Ship  9600 2.48 6.46 
         
 
Mean  5.31 5.88 
  
Mean  5.41 5.77 
         
Practice 2 IAP# Valence  Arousal  
 
No practice 
baseline IAP# Valence  Arousal  
Jaguar 1650 6.65 6.23 
 
Snake  1110 3.84 5.96 
Waterfall 5260 7.34 5.71 
 
Spider  1201 3.55 6.36 
Skydivers 5621 7.57 6.99 
 
Dog 1302 4.21 6 
Mountains  5700 7.61 5.68 
 
Shark 1930 3.79 6.42 
Windsurfers  5623 7.19 5.67 
 
Bomb 2692 3.36 5.35 
Baby 2660 7.75 4.44 
 
Cockroach 1274 3.17 5.39 
Fireworks  5910 7.8 5.59 
 
Gun 6610 3.6 5.06 
Tornado  5971 3.49 6.65 
 
Lightning  5950 5.99 6.79 
Tank 6940 3.53 5.35 
 
Cakes 7220 6.91 5.3 
Boxer 8060 5.36 5.31 
 
Pizza  7350 7.1 4.97 
Toilet  9301 2.26 5.28 
 
Gymnast 8470 7.74 6.14 
Solider 9160 3.23 5.87 
 
Motorcycle  8251 6.16 6.05 
Skull  9480 3.51 5.57 
 
Pilot  8300 7.02 6.14 
Ship  9600 2.48 6.46 
 
Money  8501 7.91 6.44 




Mean  5.41 5.77 
  
Mean  5.31 5.88 
         
 
Practice 3 IAP# Valence  Arousal  
 
No practice 
baseline IAP# Valence  Arousal  
Jaguar 1650 6.65 6.23 
 
Tornado  5971 3.49 6.65 
Waterfall 5260 7.34 5.71 
 
Spider  1201 3.55 6.36 
Skydivers 5621 7.57 6.99 
 
Dog 1302 4.21 6 
Shark 1930 3.79 6.42 
 
Mountains  5700 7.61 5.68 
Bomb 2692 3.36 5.35 
 
Windsurfers  5623 7.19 5.67 
Cockroach 1274 3.17 5.39 
 
Baby 2660 7.75 4.44 
Gun 6610 3.6 5.06 
 
Fireworks  5910 7.8 5.59 
Snake  1110 3.84 5.96 
 
Lightning  5950 5.99 6.79 
Tank 6940 3.53 5.35 
 
Cakes 7220 6.91 5.3 
Toilet  9301 2.26 5.28 
 
Pizza  7350 7.1 4.97 
Gymnast 8470 7.74 6.14 
 
Boxer 8060 5.36 5.31 
Motorcycle  8251 6.16 6.05 
 
Solider 9160 3.23 5.87 
Pilot  8300 7.02 6.14 
 
Skull  9480 3.51 5.57 
Money  8501 7.91 6.44 
 
Ship  9600 2.48 6.46 
         
 
Mean  5.28 5.89 
  
Mean  5.44 5.76 
         
Practice 4 IAP# Valence  Arousal  
 
No practice 
baseline IAP# Valence  Arousal  
Snake  1110 3.84 5.96 
 
Jaguar 1650 6.65 6.23 
Spider  1201 3.55 6.36 
 
Waterfall 5260 7.34 5.71 
Dog 1302 4.21 6 
 
Skydivers 5621 7.57 6.99 
Shark 1930 3.79 6.42 
 
Mountains  5700 7.61 5.68 
Windsurfers  5623 7.19 5.67 
 
Bomb 2692 3.36 5.35 
Baby 2660 7.75 4.44 
 
Cockroach 1274 3.17 5.39 
Fireworks  5910 7.8 5.59 
 
Gun 6610 3.6 5.06 
Lightning  5950 5.99 6.79 
 
Tornado  5971 3.49 6.65 
Cakes 7220 6.91 5.3 
 
Tank 6940 3.53 5.35 
Pizza  7350 7.1 4.97 
 
Boxer 8060 5.36 5.31 
Gymnast 8470 7.74 6.14 
 
Toilet  9301 2.26 5.28 
Solider 9160 3.23 5.87 
 
Motorcycle  8251 6.16 6.05 
Skull  9480 3.51 5.57 
 
Pilot  8300 7.02 6.14 
Ship  9600 2.48 6.46 
 
Money  8501 7.91 6.44 
         
 
Mean  5.36 5.82 
  




























Presentation of 28 images 
Outline of the study, consent & 
demographics 
INITIAL RECALL PHASE 
Presentation of subset of 14 images 
Recall of subset of images  















Mean  3.56 3.11 3.18 1.61 3.09 3.20 2.83 





























Table 2. Showing mean number of images (with SD) recalled (out of a total of 28) in the repeated 
and the non-repeated conditions for positively and negatively valenced images.  
 
 Positive Negative 
 Repeated  Not repeated Repeated  Not repeated 
Mean  3.27 3.43 4.01 3.94 





























Table 3. Showing correlation coefficients (with significance values) between precall score and the 









Correlation  -.009 .032 .106 -.053 -.068 -.016 -.016 





























Table 4. Showing mean (with SD) number of images recalled (out of a total of 14) in each of the 
four post-recall practice phases.  
 
 Post Recall 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 
Mean  10.56 11.54 11.80 11.81 
SD 2.02 1.80 1.99 1.95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
